Use case: verify signatures (upload -> validity report) #8
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Use case: user drops any signed artifact (.csig/.xsig/pdf sig), app reports: signer cert, chain to known roots (bundled FNMT root — fetch latest from fnmt.es at build time, commit only the PEM), signature integrity, signing time.
Reference: decompiled/sources/es/gob/afirma/signvalidation/ ( SigValidator) + CAdESValidator in cades/.
Acceptance:
Depends on #6, #7.
UNBLOCK NOTICE: dependency policy relaxed — do not wait for #5 to merge. Work against this interface contract (web/src/lib/certs.ts, being finalized in #5):
Until #5 lands: mock LoadedCert in your branch (test RSA/EC key + self-signed cert generated at test time via openssl/node:crypto — commit no binaries). Test fixtures for golden vectors come from reference implementations (openssl for CAdES, xmlsec1 for XAdES) or generated by scripts at test setup. Resolve merge conflicts vs bullet-develop at integration; keep web/src/lib/certs.ts imports behind a thin adapter if the API shifts.
bullet: coder launched on branch
issue/8-use-case-verify-signatures-upl(modelnan/deepseek-v4-flash).Claimed — branch
issue/8-use-case-verify-signatures-upl. Doing: CAdES+XAdES verification engine (WebCrypto public key + digest checks), per-check green/red report UI, valid+tampered fixtures with openssl cross-check (Refs #8).Issue #8 — Use case: verify signatures (upload → validity report)
Restated goal
Make the SPA able to take a signed artifact the user drops (
/.csig,/.xsig, or a PDF) andproduce a validity report: signer certificate, chain to known roots (bundled FNMT root),
signature integrity, signing time — one green/red card per check, each with a machine-checkable
reason. All of it client-side (WebCrypto; no server, no key material).
"Done" = for the two in-scope formats (CAdES per the issue's acceptance list, XAdES per the issue's
acceptance list) the report is computed from real fixtures committed under
web/test/fixtures/,one valid + one tampered per format; the tampered sample flips the integrity card red and leaves
the signature card green; unit tests cover the checks and the fixtures are cross-verified by
openssl cms -verify/ an independent c14n oracle.Context discovered (read before planning)
6916892(merge of #13). #5, #6, #7 are NOT in the base — theircode (PKCS#12 import, CAdES sign, XAdES sign) lives on unmerged sibling branches, and #7 has no
report yet. So the acceptance line "reuse #7 primitives" cannot be satisfied literally: there are
no #7 primitives in this tree. Verification is self-contained (it only needs public crypto, so
it never needed #5/#6 either), and I write the canonicalization code myself. Report will flag the
duplication as a merge-time decision.
web/src/lib/App.svelte(sign flow steps 1–2),FileDrop/FileCard/CertPicker/ SignButton/ResultCard,i18n.ts(ES/ENCopy),sign.ts(types,SIGN_FORMATS), Vitest jsdomtest
web/src/lib/App.test.ts, static SvelteKit build.xml.etree. ElementTree.canonicalize= independent C14N oracle).xmlsec1is absent.http://www.cert.fnmt.es/certs/ACRAIZFNMT.crt,CN/OU=AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM, O=FNMT-RCM, C=ES, valid 2008-10-29 → 2030-01-01,SHA-256
EB:C5:57:0C:29:01:8C:4D:67:B1:AA:12:7B:AF:12:F7:03:B4:61:1E:BC:17:B7:DA:B5:57:38:94:17:9B:93:FA;fingerprint also present in the system CA bundle (
/etc/pki/tls/certs/ca-bundle.crt), i.e. anindependent copy agrees byte-for-byte.
Scope — files I will change
New (
web/src/lib/verify/):types.ts—CheckStatus,Check,VerificationReport,TrustedRoot, options.asn1.ts— minimal DER reader (TLV, INTEGER, OID, BIT/OCTET STRING, SEQUENCE/SET, context tags).x509.ts— cert parse (serial, issuer/subject Name DER + printed DN, validity, SPKI,sigAlg/sigValue),
spkiToWebCrypto, chain building by Name-DER equality, chain signature verify,trust-anchor match by SHA-256.
cms.ts— CMSContentInfo/SignedDataparse; checks: signature oversignedAttrs(re-encoded as SET OF),
messageDigestvs content digest (attached →eContent; detached →caller-supplied document),
signingTime, content-type attr, chain ofSignerInfocert.c14n.ts— C14N 1.0 inclusive + exclusive, no comments, enveloped-signature removal.xades.ts— XMLDSigSignatureparse; checks: SignedInfo digest + SignatureValue(WebCrypto), per-
Referencetransform chain (enveloped-signature,c14n/c14n#WithCommentsinclusive, exclusive w/
InclusiveNamespacesPrefixList) + digest compare, KeyInfo cert, XAdESSigningTime.detect.ts— sniff.csig(DERContentInfo→ id-signedData) vs.xsig(XML w/ds:Signature)vs PDF (
%PDF-).index.ts—verifyArtifact(bytes, {fileName, detachedDocument?, trustedRoots?})→ report.roots/fnmt-racm.pem— committed PEM (fetched byweb/scripts/fetch-roots.sh, fingerprintasserted by the script).
web/scripts/fetch-roots.sh— re-fetch + assert subject/fingerprint; writes the PEM.web/src/lib/verify.test.ts,web/src/lib/verify/c14n.test.ts— unit + fixture tests.web/src/lib/components/VerifyReport.svelte— green/red card per check with reason.web/test/fixtures/—README.md,generate.sh,verify-fixtures.sh,ca/(test root,intermediate, signer, chain PEM;
*.keygitignored),cades-valid.csig,cades-tampered.csig,cades-detached.csig,xades-valid.xsig,xades-tampered.xsig,document.txt,document-tampered.txt,c14n/(independent oracle vectors from pythoncanonicalize).Modified:
web/src/lib/App.svelte(mode switch sign/verify + verify panel),web/src/lib/i18n.ts(verify copy ES/EN),
web/src/lib/App.test.ts(verify-mode assertions),web/README.md(verifyflow + fixtures),
web/.gitignore-equivalent for fixture keys (root.gitignoreif none),AGENTS.mduntouched.
Not touched:
decompiled/**(read-only reference),decompiled-configurador/**,original/**,extracted/**,Containerfile,Caddyfile,web/package.json(no new dependency), the sign flowsemantics,
.bullet/**(never committed).Ordered tasks (each with its verify command)
web/src/lib/verify/roots/fnmt-racm.pem,web/scripts/fetch-roots.sh.Verify:
bash web/scripts/fetch-roots.sh && openssl x509 -in web/src/lib/verify/roots/fnmt-racm.pem -noout -fingerprint -sha256→
EB:C5:…:93:FA.CAdES attached valid + tampered, CAdES detached, XAdES enveloped valid + tampered, oracle c14n
vectors. Verify:
bash web/test/fixtures/verify-fixtures.sh(openssl CMS verify + independentpython digest recompute) exits 0.
asn1.ts,x509.ts,cms.ts).Verify:
pnpm test -- verify(fixture-driven CAdES checks) + the openssl cross-check test.c14n.ts,xades.ts).Verify:
pnpm test -- c14n(oracle vectors) and the XAdES fixture checks.detect.ts,index.ts,VerifyReport.svelte,i18n.ts,App.svelte).Verify: extended
pnpm test(mount App, switch to verify, assert report cards) +pnpm buildpnpm check.pnpm build, dev-server smoke of the verify flow with thefixtures via a real browser tab (
file:///vite preview), then the bullet gates.Open questions → assumptions I proceed on
with #7's later ("reuse #7 primitives" is recorded as unmet-by-construction, not silently).
.csigattached or detached? AutoFirma/#6 emit detached. Assumption: support both;detached digest check needs the original document, so the verify panel accepts an optional second
file and the check reads "not verifiable — original document not provided" (red, with reason)
until it is. Fixtures cover attached-valid, attached-tampered, detached+document,
detached+document-tampered.
trusted (FNMT)" from "chain valid, root NOT in trust store" from "chain broken". Tests inject the
fixture test root as a trusted root to exercise the green path; the shipped default store is FNMT.
pdf sig, but the acceptance list covers CAdES + XAdES onlyand PAdES signing is issue #11. Assumption: detect PDF and emit an explicit "not supported yet
(issue #11)" result instead of a bogus red integrity card. Recorded in the report.
not reported as checks rather than reported as failing.
r||s→ raw WebCrypto), because AutoFirma signs with whateverthe cert holds; RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 is the tested path. RSASSA-PSS unsupported (noted).
Risk and fallback
Mitigation: two-mode implementation (inclusive/exclusive, no comments) validated against
python-
canonicalizeoracle vectors; if an exotic case fails, the check reports a red card withthe reason "unsupported transform" rather than a wrong green — never silently pass.
cms -sign -nodetach, default signed attrsincl. signingTime). Fallback:
-md sha256 -nodetachexplicit, and if openssl's attribute setdrifts, the test asserts the attribute OIDs it relies on rather than accepting anything.
the core supports it and the panel falls back to "not verifiable" + reason (still honest, still
green-path-verifiable in tests).
?rawPEM import is ~1.4 kB; no dependency added; ifpnpm checkobjectsto the
?rawtyping, add the tinyvite/clienttype reference rather than any new package.DONE — branch
issue/8-use-case-verify-signatures-upl, commits52d7555,0f1161d,6b1172c,c691f2d,1cefd5a; worktree clean, not pushed.Gates:
test -d decompiled→ 0find decompiled -name '*.java' | grep -q .→ 0git diff --checkclean,git status --shortempty, no closing keyword (Refs #8only)pnpm test26/26 (3 files),pnpm check0 errors,pnpm buildok,web/test/fixtures/verify-fixtures.sh25 ok / exit 0Acceptance: CAdES via WebCrypto over re-encoded signedAttrs + messageDigest vs content (attached and detached); XAdES via C14N + per-Reference digest + SignatureValue; report UI verified in a real headless Chromium against the built SPA (tampered CAdES → contentDigest red, signature green; XAdES valid → signature + both references green, chain red because the fixture root is not a trust anchor; detached CAdES → info then pass after dropping the original document); fixtures valid+tampered per format with openssl cross-check.
Needs a human: #6/#7 are not in this base, so c14n/XMLDSig is written here and must be consolidated when #7 lands; detached CAdES needs the original document; trust = bundled FNMT root only (no revocation/TSA); PDF → explicit "not yet (#11)" card. Two fixture bugs found and fixed:
X509Certificatewas base64-of-PEM instead of base64-of-DER, and Reference 2's digest used C14N 2.0 namespace semantics (now an exclusive-C14N transform). Full details in.bullet/meta/issue-8.report.md.bullet: coder session died — relaunched from committed state (branch
issue/8-use-case-verify-signatures-upl).bullet: implementation finished (DONE — branch
issue/8-use-case-verify-signatures-upl, commits52d7555,0f1161d,6b1172c,c691f2d,1cefd5a; worktree clean, not pushed.) — moving to review.bullet: reviewer launched (model
9router/reviewer, independent of coder).Claimed — branch
issue/8-use-case-verify-signatures-upl. Doing: independently verify the five commits already on this branch against every acceptance criterion (engine, report UI, fixtures, openssl cross-check, real browser smoke), fix any defect, then report.Issue #8 — Use case: verify signatures (upload → validity report)
Restated goal
A user drops a signed artifact (
.csigCAdES,.xsigXAdES, PDF) into the app and gets aper-check validity report: signer certificate, chain up to a bundled FNMT root, signature
integrity, signing time. "Done" = the verify flow works end to end in a real browser with
crypto.subtleonly (no new dependency, no backend), CAdES verification does a CMS digest checkover the DER re-encoded signed attributes, XAdES verification reuses the issue #7 c14n primitives
and checks every
ds:Reference, the report UI renders one green/red card per check with atechnical reason, and
test/fixtures/holds one valid + one tampered sample per format with anopenssl-based cross-check.Pre-existing state (important)
This branch already carries five commits from an earlier session that were never verified or
reported (no
issue-8.plan.md/issue-8.report.mdinmeta/):52d75550f1161d6b1172cc691f2d1cefd5aweb/README.mdSo this session is verification-and-completion, not greenfield: independently exercise every
acceptance criterion, fix whatever is broken, and report. No rewriting of working code.
Scope
Will change (only if verification finds a defect):
web/src/lib/verify/*.ts— the verification engine (asn1, cms, x509, xades, c14n, digest, detect, index, types)web/src/lib/components/VerifyReport.svelte,web/src/lib/App.svelte,web/src/lib/i18n.tsweb/src/lib/*.test.ts,web/test/fixtures/*web/README.mdWill not touch:
decompiled/**— read-only reference (hard rule 3).original/,extracted/,work/— gitignored (hard rules 1, 2).sign.ts/ the signing flow beyond the shared shell — that is #5/#6/#7.vite.config.ts,tsconfig.json,package.json) unless a defect forces it;no new dependency.
Ordered tasks
Verify:
test -f /home/eduardez/workspace/AutoFirme/.bullet/meta/issue-8.plan.mdtest -d decompiled && find decompiled -name '*.java' | grep -q . && git diff --checkcd web && pnpm test— must include the openssl/python cross-check of the fixtures.bash web/test/fixtures/verify-fixtures.sh— every lineok, noFAIL.cades-valid.csig/xades-valid.xsigwithopenssl cms -verifyandxmlsec1 --verify(or the fixture script ifxmlsec1is absent), and confirm the tamperedsamples are rejected by openssl too, so the fixtures are genuinely valid/invalid.
cd web && pnpm build, servebuild/, open a Chromium tab,switch to Verificar, upload
cades-valid.csig,cades-tampered.csig,xades-valid.xsig,xades-tampered.xsig, and a PDF. Assert card statuses (data-check/data-status) and take ascreenshot. This is the acceptance criterion the unit tests cannot prove.
verify: … (Refs #8).issue-8.report.md, post the Done comment.Open questions (assumptions I proceed on)
the PEM".
web/scripts/fetch-roots.shdoes the fetching/validation; the committed anchor lives inweb/src/lib/verify/roots/fnmt-racm.tsas a.tsmodule (so the static bundle inlines it). Thetests use a throwaway test PKI, never the real root, so a wrong/rotated FNMT PEM cannot break CI.
Assumption: that satisfies "commit only the PEM" — flagging it in the report as a human check.
reported as an explicit red/info check rather than a silent pass. Assumption: acceptable, noted.
check stays
infountil supplied. Assumption: correct behaviour, matches AutoFirma.unsupported rather than passed.
Risk
the browsers'
crypto.subtlein the smoke test plus the openssl cross-check; ifpnpm testshowscrypto being stubbed, that is a red gate and a real bug.
pnpm testshelling out toopenssl— fails on a machine without it. Boring fallback: thecross-check stays a separate script gate (task 4) and the vitest case is reported, not deleted.
python3 -m http.servermangles the SPA, usepnpm preview.scratch dir if a fixture is found broken, and diffed before committing.
Boring fallbacks
Two failed attempts on any single check → take the standard path, note it in the report, move on
(rabbit-hole cap). A red gate is information: never weaken a test to get green.
DONE — commits
52d7555 0f1161d 6b1172c c691f2d 1cefd5a(earlier session, unverified) +b0b3896(this session: signature-tamper tests). Nothing pushed.Gates, all exit 0:
test -d decompiled/find decompiled -name '*.java' | grep -q .git diff --checkcd web && pnpm test→ 3 files, 28 tests passed (includesopenssl cms -verify+ independent digest cross-check)cd web && pnpm check→ 381 files, 0 errors 0 warningscd web && pnpm build→ static build okIndependent evidence:
openssl cms -verifyrc0 on cades-valid / rc4 on cades-tampered;xmlsec1 --verifyOK on xades-valid / FAILED on xades-tampered; committed FNMT anchor is byte-identical to a fresh download of cert.fnmt.es/certs/ACRAIZFNMT.crt (sha256 EB:C5:…:93:FA); real headless-Chromium smoke of the built SPA covering valid/tampered CAdES, valid/tampered XAdES, detached CAdES with and without the original document, and PDF (singleunsupported[info]card, no crash) — per-check green/red cards with reasons all render as expected.Human decision needed: #6, #7 and #8 all forked from
6916892and each wrote its own asn1/x509 (+cms/c14n/xades) layer under different paths (lib/vslib/verify/), so integration keeps duplicated parsers. Consolidation plan needed at merge time. Full detail inmeta/issue-8.report.md.REVIEW: FIXED 3 — commit
38de493: findings: (1) malformed ds:SignatureValue base64 made verifyArtifact reject (silent blank UI) → boundary catch in web/src/lib/verify/index.ts now returns a red structure card, regression test added — fixed38de493; (2) asn1.ts octets() truncated the last byte of BIT STRINGs with unused>0 (wrong per RFC 8017) → subarray(1) — fixed38de493; (3)git diff --check 6916892..HEADflagged deliberate CRLF in test/fixtures/document*.txt while report claimed clean → web/test/fixtures/.gitattributes markswhitespace=cr-at-eol— fixed38de493. UNFIXED: report says 26 tests (tree actually has 28 pre-fix / 29 post-fix) and its plan-delta list omits the plan's roots/fnmt-racm.pem → fnmt-racm.ts swap (files-changed list discloses it) — documentation nits in the implementer's report.bullet: PR #16 open →
bullet-develop(auto-merge follows).bullet: merge blocked (HTTP 405) — conciliation agent merges trunk work into
bullet-develop; PR auto-merges next tick.bullet: merge conflicts with
bullet-develop— conflict-solver agent owns the worktree until it pushes.bullet: merge blocked (HTTP 405) — conciliation agent merges trunk work into
bullet-develop; PR auto-merges next tick.Claimed — branch
bullet-develop. Doing: merge origin/main into bullet-develop, run gates, push.RECONCILED: trunk work merged into bullet-develop (conflicts resolved: none — trunk commit
3c2c80bwas a rolling-PR merge of bullet-develop itself, trees identical, mergec8ff24fhas zero content delta)INTEGRATED: #8 merged into bullet-develop (conflicts resolved: kept #8 mode-tab verify UI + #6/#7 real sign panel in App.svelte; unioned App.test imports; merged i18n type imports/copy and README module table; one shared vitest setup, dropped duplicate test/setup.ts)
bullet: merged into
bullet-develop— integration gates green.bullet: PR #16 closed — work already merged into
bullet-develop.